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This article addresses the question of why the historical approach to the study of ancient philosophy gave way in the first decades of the twentieth century to a philosophical approach that examines the philosophical ideas of the past in isolation from their historical context. The author argues that, notwithstanding the differences between the historical and the philosophical approaches, they rest on the common presupposition that the study of the history of philosophy is inseparable from philosophy. Therefore, the development of the modern historiography of philosophy reflects the development of modern philosophy itself rather than a methodological turn. This analysis brings to light the difficulties arising from another assumption common to the two approaches, namely, that a historical study of philosophy ought to set philosophical ideas in their extra-philosophical context. This assumption tacitly presupposes that philosophical ideas themselves and the arguments in their support are not subject to historical analysis, because they do not change over the course of history. The author shows that although this presupposition leads to the employment of historical methods, it does not necessarily result in a historical understanding of the philosophy of the past. On the contrary, it is more prone to anachronism than an approach that avoids historical methods.
Orna Harari is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Classical Studies at Tel Aviv University. Her publications deal mainly with logic, mathematics, methodology of science, causality and explanation in the classical era and the late-antique commentary tradition.